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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction i. n con ferret J on this tuu , f pursuant 5 ;.-. 
Code Annotated Section 77-35-26 (2)(a> ( < i -n\> J- • 
Utah Code Annotated Section 78-2a-3(2)(j), 11953 as amended) 
whereby the defendant n MI < i* i in i na I lU'.t. ion may take an appeal 
from a conviction and final judgment. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARD Ut REVIEW 
I Hi (J t.he court err in failing to adequately instruct 
l-ho jui'j i uhe elements of attempted escape? A correction of 
error standard of review is applicable. 
2, Did the trial court err ii :i failing to adequately voir 
d:i re the 1111 v""«" «rrection of error standard oi review is 
applicable. 
1 
STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The text of those statutes and constitutional provisions 
that do not appear in the body of the brief are included in 
Appendix A. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Appellant was charged with Escape, a second degree felony 
and convicted of Attempted Escape, a third degree felony, 
following a jury trial on May 7, 1990, before the Hon. Pat B. 
Brian, a judge of the Third Judicial District Court. Appellant 
was sentenced to serve a consecutive sentence of not more than 
five years at the Utah State Prison. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellant was charged with Escape in that he had been 
committed to the Utah State Prison and was currently housed at 
the Orange Street Community Correctional Center in Salt Lake 
County. The parties stipulated that appellant was serving a 
term in the Utah State Prison of not more than five years for 
theft. Appellant was not present for a count at the Orange 
Street Community Correctional Center on August 7, 1989 and could 
not be located. Eight (8) hours later, appellant was arrested 
by authorities in California. T. 46-47. 
Appellant claimed, as his defense, that his departure, as 
had been previously stipulated, was necessary and justified. 
T.48-84. He testified that he was a witness to a racial riot 
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which took place in Salt Lake City In July 1982 wherein his best 
friend was ki .led. T 48 Appellant, testified, i n that matter, 
against Danny Lucero, nicknamed "Tiger". T * g 
•that testimony, appellant was labeled as a "snitch" and was 
placed in protective custody six month1, after he arrived at the 
prison. T. 51-53, 59. 
Wf prison, appellant -i involved J several 
incidents when safety was - , - . • ie such 
incident . or - appellant's throat. Thereafter, 
nsferred to the Orange Street facility. T S 3 . 
Three days after he was allowed to go iitfo l he cuiiiiiimi i I y on 
his own, appellant was approached by an individual known as 
"Weasel e knew appellant had testified 
against Lucero. This individual threatened t •'*'•" "pel I ani 
unless he was given $1,000.00 a month. T.53-55, 
Mr. Simpson report/enJ the inc. oien I to one oi the ounselors 
at the half-way house. The counselor was unaware that appellant 
was in protective custody and told him there was nothing that 
could be done for his protection T 'ib-56., She itly thereafter, 
while appellant was waiting for a bus, he was again approached 
"Weasel" and two other Hispanic males who asked :-• .-r money. 
Appellant traveled on tl>' hu- hi Bo ml ilul, : sunic 
money from hi s sister on his way to California. '-58. 
Appellant testa i ^d that he went to California because his lite 
was iii danger and he did not believe i t IF aIJ it tor 11 
would do anything to I lelp him. 
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In rebuttal, the State presented the testimony of 
appellant's sister, Colleen Bay. Ms. Bay testified that on 
Friday, she and appellant had arranged for him to come to her 
house the following Monday and pick up an inheritance check from 
her. T. 90-91. Mr. Simpson arrived at 8:45 a.m. took the check 
and left. The State also presented evidence that Mr. Simpson 
cashed the check that same morning at Zion's Bank in 
Centerville, Utah. T. 94. 
At a jury trial before the Hon. Pat Brian, a Judge of the 
Third Judicial District Court, appellant's attorney attempted to 
ask certain voir dire questions to the jury. Counsel objected 
to the Court's failure to ask certain questions of the 
prospective jury panel. T. 32-34. 
Counsel for appellant had further submitted to the Court a 
jury Instruction concerning the lesser included offense of 
Attempted Escape. That instruction was submitted to the jury 
and appellant was convicted of that lesser included offense and 
sentenced to the Utah State Prison. Appendix B. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Attempted Escape instruction failed to adequately 
instruct the jury as to the required elements of that lesser 
included offense. Although appellant was convicted of the 
lesser included offense, he is entitled to a new trial or a 
reversal of his conviction because of that defective 
instruction. 
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The Court's failure to inquire of the prospective jury 
panel with the questions requested, both written and oral, from 
appellant's counsel precluded her from assessing juror bias and 
intelligently using her peremptory challenges. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
DID THE COURT ERR IN FAILING TO ADEQUATELY 
INSTRUCT THE JURY ON THE ELEMENTS OF ATTEMPTED ESCAPE? 
Instruction 20 (Appendix B) represented the requested 
lesser included offense of Attempted Escape. This instruction 
attempted to outline the elements of that offense once the jury 
had determined that they could not convict appellant of the 
underlying offense charged in the Information of Escape. 
This Instruction is inadequate in that it fails to define 
attempt and includes an incorrect mental state. (Appendix A, B; 
Amendment XIV, United States Constitution; Article I, Section 7, 
Utah Constitution.) 
The trial court is required to accurately instruct the jury 
as to the elements of an offense. State v. Laine 618 P.2d 33, 
(Utah 1980); State v. Lesley 672 P. 2d 79, (Utah 1983). 
"An accurate instruction upon the basic 
elements of the offense charged is 
essential, and the failure to so instruct 
constitutes reversible error." 
Laine, supra, at page 35. 
Where a jury instruction misstates the applicable mental 
state, reversal is required even though the party had failed to 
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obj ect. 
In State v. Harmon, 712 P. 2d. 291 (Utah 1986), the Utah 
Supreme Court reviewed a jury instruction for Attempted Robbery 
where the trial court merely inserted the word "attempted" in a 
previously prepared elements instruction for the crime of 
Robbery. The Court held that the trial court "failed to 
instruct the jury on the specific elements of attempt" contained 
in Utah Code Annotated Section 76-4-101 (1953 as amended) and 
reversed the conviction, remanding it for a new trial. The 
court concluded: 
"Specifically, the Court failed to instruct that 
in order to convict of attempted robbery, the jury 
must find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that defendant's 
conduct constituted a 'substantial step1 toward 
commission of the offense and that the substantial 
step must be f strongly corroborativef of defendantf s 
intent to commit the offense. 
Supra. at page 291. 
The jury instruction in this case is almost identical to 
Harmon. The elements instruction for Attempted Escape contains 
the word attempted but does not define the word or clarify that 
the defendantf s conduct must represent a substantial step toward 
the commission of the offense which is strongly corroborative of 
defendant's intent to commit the underlying offense. In order 
to be guilty of an attempt, an individual must intend to commit 
the underlying offense. 
In State v. Norman, 580 P. 2d. 237 (Utah 1978), a case 
involving Attempted Reckless Manslaughter, the Supreme Court 
determined: 
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"An attempt to commit a crime is an act done with 
the intent to commit that crime beyond mere 
preparation but which falls short of actual 
commission." 
Supra, at page 238. 
In State v. Bell, 785 P.2d. 390 (Utah 1989), involving an 
appeal for attempted second degree murder and aggravated robbery 
and the duel sentences imposed. It gives further consideration 
to the concept that in order to prove an attempt, there must 
also be proof that your intention was to commit the underlying 
offense and that substantial steps were taken that are strongly 
corroborative of this intention. 
Title 76, Chapter 4, Section 101 Utah Code Annotated (1953 
as amended) outlines the elements to consider in determining the 
guilt of the defendant to attempt to commit an offense. First, 
the actor must have the required mental state to commit the 
underlying offense. Secondly, the actor engages in conduct 
constituting a substantial step toward commission of the 
offense. Finally, in judging whether the actor engaged in a 
substantial step, his actions must be strongly corroborative of 
an intent to commit the underlying offense. (Appendix A and B. ) 
None of these concepts were adequately outlined for the 
jury within the instruction. 
The instruction is practically identical to the jury 
instruction for the underlying offense of escape. The 
instruction is inadequate, and appellant is entitled to a new 
trial or reversal of the conviction. 
7 
POINT II 
DID THE COURT ERR IN FAILING 
TO ADEQUATELY VOIR DIRE THE JURY? 
Counsel for appellant submitted written voir dire questions 
to the Court to facilitate her ability to judge juror bias. An 
objection was made to the Court's failure to inquire of the jury 
regarding their feelings about the penalty which may be imposed 
by the court. Counsel also requested questions concerning juror 
feeling about the proposed defense of necessity. Questions were 
also requested concerning the juror feeling of prisoners in the 
Utah State Prison and whether they felt pressure from criticism 
if they acquitted appellant. Further questions involved probing 
the prospective jury panel concerning their feelings of the 
rights of prisoners to protection while incarcerated. (T. 32-
34.) All these areas of inquiry were necessary to an informed 
and adequate understanding of the prospective jury panel and 
their ability to sit as jurors on this particular case. 
The trial court, in refusing to ask these questions and 
follow-up questions, as requested by counsel, which would have 
aided in detecting juror bias, are the basis for determining 
that there was prejudicial error in selecting the jury. 
Consequently, the conviction in this matter should be reversed. 
(Appendix A, Amendment XIV, United States Constitution; Article 
I, Section 7, Constitution of the State of Utah.) 
Voir dire plays an important role in protecting a criminal 
defendant's right to an impartial jury. In Rosales-Lopez v. 
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United States, 451 U.S. 182 (1981), the United States Supreme 
Court stated: 
"Voir dire plays a critical function in assuring 
the criminal defendant that his Sixth Amendment right 
to an impartial jury will be honored. Without an 
adequate voir dire, the trial judge's responsibility 
to remove prospective jurors who will not be able to 
impartially follow the court's instructions and 
evaluate the evidence cannot be fulfilled. See Connor 
v. United States, 158 U.S. 408 (1895)." 
Supra, at page 188. 
Furthermore, a defendant's right to due process and a fair 
trial requires that an adequate voir dire of the jury panel be 
conducted in a criminal case. State v. Taylor, 664 P.2d 439 
(Utah 1983); State v. Bishop, 753 P. 2d 439 (Utah 1988). 
In Taylor, supra, the Utah Supreme Court ordered a new 
trial where faulty recording equipment made it impossible for 
that court to review the voir dire questions and answers and 
therefore unable to decide appellant's claims regarding an 
inadequate examination of the jurors. This decision emphasized 
that voir dire has two purposes. They include the detection of 
actual bias and collection of data to permit informed exercise 
of the peremptory challenge. 
In State v. Ball, 685 P. 2d 1055 (Utah 1984), an appeal for 
driving under the influence of alcohol, the Utah Supreme Court 
reiterated that: 
"Voir dire examination has, as its proper 
purposes, both the detection of actual bias and the 
collection of data to permit informed exercise of the 
peremptory challenge." 
Citing Taylor, supra at page 1059. 
9 
In reaching its decision that the trial court erred in not 
asking the potential jurors whether they did not drink alcoholic 
beverages because of personal conviction or religious reasons, 
the Supreme Court focused on the second purpose of voir dire. 
This second purpose is the valuable function of the peremptory 
challenge. In Ball, the Court stated: 
"Properly utilized, however, it may be seen that 
the peremptory challenge performs a valuable function 
in our jury system. Its efficacy is necessarily 
vitiated when a party is not permitted to gather 
enough information for prospective jurors in order to 
exercise his right intelligently." 
Ball, supra, at 1059. 
In State v. Worthen, 765 P. 2d 839 (Utah 1988), the Utah 
Supreme Court stated: 
"Although a trial judge has some discretion in 
limiting voir dire examination, State v. Bishop, 753 
P. 2d 439, 448 (Utah 1988), that discretion should be 
liberally exercised in favor of allowing counsel to 
elicit information from prospective jurors." 
Supra, at page 845. 
In State v. Hall, 797 P.2d 470 (Utah App. 1990), this Court 
reversed a defendantf s criminal conviction for rape where the 
trial judge failed to ask the prospective jurors whether any of 
them had friends or relatives employed in the County Attorney's 
Office. 
"Trial courts have broad discretion in managing 
voir dire, but that discretion must be exercised in 
favor of allowing discovery of biases or prejudice in 
prospective j urors." 
Supra, at page 472. 
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The questions propounded by counsel for appellant were 
relevant and necessary to her ability to assist prospective 
jurors and determine bias. The court's failure to ask the 
proposed questions represented reversible error. 
CONCLUSION 
The Court erred in instructing the jury inadequately in the 
concept of Attempt as it relates to Escape. The instruction was 
deficient in that it failed to properly define the "substantial 
step" necessary to have attempted an offense. Also, the 
required mental state improperly focused on an intention to 
attempt the offense rather than intending to commit the 
underlying offense. 
The Court erred in failing to adequately voir dire the jury 
and thus prevented counsel from being able to reasonably assess 
juror bias and exercise peremptory challenges. 
For the foregoing, appellant is entitled to a new trial or 
reversal of his conviction. 
Dated this / y day of February, 1991. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that four (4) copies of the foregoing 
Brief of Appellant were delivered to the Attorney General's 
Office, 236 State Capitol Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, 
this J{~ day of February, 1991. 
12 
APPENDIX A 
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 
AMENDMENT VI 
[Rights of accused] 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy 
the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of 
the State and district wherein the crime shall have been 
committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained 
by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the 
accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to 
have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, 
and to have the Assistance of counsel for his defence. 
AMENDMENT XIV 
Section 1. [Citizenship — Due process of law — Equal 
protection.] 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and 
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United 
States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall 
make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or 
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State 
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction 
the equal protection of the laws. 
CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ARTICLE I, Section 7. [Due process of law.] 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, 
without due process of law. 
ARTICLE I, Section 12. [Rights of accused persons] 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the 
right to appear and defend in person and by counsel, to demand 
the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a 
copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to be confronted by 
the witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to compel 
the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy 
public trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in 
which the offense is alleged to have been committed, and the 
right to appeal in all cases. In no instance shall any accused 
person, before final judgment, be compelled to give evidence 
against himself; a wife shall not be compelled to testify 
against her husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor shall 
any person be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense. 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
PART 1 
ATTEMPT 
Title 76, Chapter 4, Section 101 Attempt - Elements 
(1) For purposes of this part a person is guilty of an 
attempt to commit a crime if, acting with the kind of 
culpability otherwise required for the commission of the 
offense, he engages in conduct constituting a substantial step 
toward commission of the offense. 
(2) For purposes of this part, conduct does not constitute 
a substantial step unless it is strongly corroborative of the 
actor's intent to commit the offense. 
(3) No defense to the offense of attempt shall arise: 
(a) Because the offense attempted was actually 
committed; or 
(b) Due to factual or legal impossibility if the 
offense could have been committed had the attendant 
circumstances been as the actor believed them to be. 
1973 
Title 76, Chapter 8, Section 309 Escape -- Term for escape 
from the state prison. 
(1) A person is guilty of escape if he escapes from 
official custody. 
(2) The offense is a felony of the second degree if: 
(a) The actor employs force, threat, or a deadly 
weapon against any person to effect the escape; 
or 
(b) The actor escapes from confinement in the state 
prison. Otherwise, escape is a class B misdemeanor. 
(3) "Official custody," for the purpose of this section, 
means arrest, custody in a penal institution, jail, an 
institution for confinement of juvenile offenders, or other 
confinement pursuant to an order of the court. For purposes of 
this section a person is deemed to be confined in the Utah state 
prison if he has been sentenced and committed and the sentence 
has not been terminated or voided or the prisoner is not on 
parole. 
(4) The term imposed upon a person escaping confinement in 
the state prison shall commence from the time the actor would 
otherwise have been discharged from the prison the term or terms 
which he was serving. 
APPENDIX B 
INSTRUCTION NO. Q 
Before you can convict the defendant, CURTIS GALEN 
SIMPSON, of the crime of Escape from Official Custody you must find 
from the evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt, all of the following 
elements of that crime: 
1. That on or about the 7th, of August, 1989, in Salt 
Lake County, Utah, the defendant, CURTIS GALEN SIMPSON was under 
official custody of the Utah State Prison. 
2. That said sentence of confinement had not been 
terminated. 
3. That said defendant escaped from official custody. 
4. That said escape was done knowingly or intentionally 
by said defendant. 
If you believe that the evidence establishes each and all 
of the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt, 
it is your duty to convict the defendant. On the other hand, if 
the evidence has failed to so establish one or more of said 
elements then you should find the defendant not guilty, and then 
consider the lesser included offense of Attempted Escape. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. ,2.0 
If you find that the State has not proven any element of 
the charge of Escape beyond a reasonable doubt, you may then 
consider the elements to the crime of Attempted Escape. 
The State has the burden of proving each element of this 
offense beyond a reasonable doubt. The elements of Attempted Escape 
are: 
1. That on or about the 7th day of August, 1989, the 
defendant, CURTIS GALEN SIMPSON, was in official custody at 
the Orange Street Community Correctional Center. 
2. That on or about the 7th day of August, 1989, the 
defendant attempted to escape from such official custody. 
3. That in so doing the defendant acted intentionally or 
knowingly. 
If you find that the State has failed to produce evidence 
to prove any one or more of these essential elements to your 
satisfaction beyond a reasonable doubt, then it is your duty to 
acquit the defendant. 
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